Municipal Taxation - Charitable Exemption - Tax Enabling Act by Stein, Ronald M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 9 Number 2 Article 13 
1970 
Municipal Taxation - Charitable Exemption - Tax Enabling Act 
Ronald M. Stein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ronald M. Stein, Municipal Taxation - Charitable Exemption - Tax Enabling Act, 9 Duq. L. Rev. 308 (1970). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol9/iss2/13 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Duquesne Law Review
MUNICIPAL TAXATION-CHARITABLE EXEMPTION-TAX ENABLING ACT-
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held a municipality cannot
tax the gross receipts of hospitals and other institutions under the
Local Tax Enabling Act.'
Appeal of Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 439 Pa. 295, 266 A.2d 619 (1970).
The City of Pittsburgh, pursuant to the Local Tax Enabling Act,2
passed the Institution and Service Privilege Tax Ordinance,' levying a
6 mill tax on the gross receipts oE institutions performing services in
the city. The institutions were defined as: "any organization, corpora-
tion, unincorporated association or any other entity, including but
not limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, colleges, universities, schools
other than elementary and secondary schools, cemeteries, veterans' posts
and recreational centers and all other organizations, which provide
service to the general public."4 Twenty-eight institutions, performing
health related services, challenged the ordinance 5 as not delegated by the
Local Tax Enabling Act.6
Accepting the appellant's contention, the lower court 7 found the ordi-
nance8 invalid. The court held "that the policy of our court has been to
require that a statute which deprives a charitable institution of a pre-
vious exemption from taxation must do so in specific and unmistakable
terms.' 9 Affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court ° found
that legislation would have to be explicit to overrule the tax exempt
status of charitable institutions. 1
On appeal, the city claimed sections two and three of the Local Tax
Enabling Act12 granted it the power to levy the Institution and Service
1. Act 511 of 1965, P.L. 1257, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 676, Dec. 22, 1968.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Act 511 of 1965, P.L. 1257, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (1970).
7. Appeal of Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas-Civil
Division, Allegheny County, No. 8 (1969).
8. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 676, Dec. 22, 1968.
9. See note 7.
10. Appeal of Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania v. City of Pittsburgh, 439 Pa.
295, 266 A.2d 619 (1970).
11. Id. at 622.
12. Act 511 of 1965, P.L. 1257, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (1970). "Cities
of the secons class may in their discretion levy, assess and collect such taxes as they shall
determine on persons' transaction, occupation, privileges, subjects, and personal property
within the limits of such political subdivisions . . ."
"It is the intention of this action to confer upon such political subdivision the power
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Privilege Tax.13 Interpreting these sections, the city contended it had
the power to tax anything the Commonwealth could tax.14 This con-
struction circumvented any inconsistency with the General County
Assessment Law,' 5 which grants exemption from "all county, city,
borough, township, road, poor, and school tax to wit: all hospitals,
universities, and colleges.. ."16 It argued that the legislative history of
the Local Tax Enabling Act' 7 demonstrated that the act was in response
to the declining tax base within the subdivisions of the Commonwealth.
As the original sources of income, almost entirely from real estate,
proved insufficient to meet the increasing costs of local government
pressure was brought upon the legislature to authorize the taxation
of previously forbidden fields.'
The city claimed the General County Assessment Law'9 only exempted
charities from real property taxes.20
The supreme court, rejecting the city's interpretation of sections two
and three,21 found the charitable exemption of the General County
Assessment Law22 applicable to all taxes.
Neither the constitution, nor the statute says the exemption will be
only for property taxes; the statute, in fact, expressly says 'all tax.'
The word 'property' is used merely to describe the locus of what
the Legislature was exempting it from. There is no reason to as-
sume that the Legislature did not fully exercise its constitutional
power to exempt this property, not only from property taxes, but
also from taxes on activities conducted on the property.23
The court concluded: "thus it is clear that the instant case like the
to levy assess and collect taxes upon any and all subjects of taxation which the common-
wealth has power to tax but which it does not tax or license
13. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 676, Dec. 22, 1968.
14. See note 10.
15. Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 862, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. it. 72, § 5020-204 ,(1968).
16. Id.
17. Act 511 of 1965, P. L. 1257, PuRDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (1970).
18. In Rose Township v. Hollobourgh, 179 Pa. Super 284, 116 A.2d 323 (1955); This
case refers to Act 481, P.L. 1145, PURwON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 2015.1 (1947), which
was the original "Tax Anything Act."
19. Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 862, PURDON's PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204 (1968).
20. Y.M.C.A. of Germantown v. Philadelphia, 323 Pa. 401 (1936), 187 A. 204 (1936): This
case held that property which was not used for charitable purposes could not be exempted.
21. Act 511 of 1965, P.L. 1257, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (1970).
22. Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 862, PURnON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204 (1968).
23. 436 Pa. 54, 258 A.2d 630 (1969): This case involved the tax assessment by the town-
ship on the parking adjacent to the county airport. The case clearly explained the county
assessment law to include all taxes within the exemption.
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public property used for public purposes in the Moon Township Case
are exempt from the tax sought to be imposed. 24
The court refused to accept the city's contention that the legislature
had implicitly given it the power to tax charitable institutions. Citing
Trustee of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church v. Gratz25
as controlling, the court held charitable exemption will be assumed
unless explicitly revoked by legislation. In that case a tax on personal
property had been passed by the General Assembly. A trustee, holding
property for the church claimed exemption through an act of the Gen-
eral Assembly. Although the proviso was held unconstitutional, the
majority of the court held:
It is not encumbent-upon the plaintiff to show any exemption until
it is clearly demonstrated that they are subject to the tax, and they
are clearly in the word and meaning of the act imposed. The ques-
tion is not whether they are in the exemption of the Act of 1874,
but if they are within the Act of 1889.26
Until the municipality shows it has the power to tax, the charity does
not have to prove it is exempt. The question was again before the
supreme court in Mattern v. Canevin.27 There the majority found a
mortgage held by a defendant for religious and charitable purposes tax
exempt. The court stated:
The court would not feel called upon to adopt a different rule of
construction in the absence of legislative enactment which in clear
and express terms should provide for the taxation of property
held.28
Following these precedents, Commonwealth v. First National Bank
of Scranton29 held charities exempt from a tax upon shareholders to be
collected by banks pursuant to a taxing act. Interpreting the statute, the
court cited Church of the Holy Trinity:30 "a thing may be within the
letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute because it is not
. 24. 436 Pa. 54, 56, 258 A.2d 630, 632 (1969) as quoted by the court, 439 Pa. at 298,
266 A.2d at 622.
25. The General Assembly v. Gratz, 139 Pa. 497, 20 A. 1041 (1891). See also Buhl's
Estate, 300 Pa. 29, 150 A. 86 (1939); Commonwealth v. Keystone State Building and Loan
Ass'n, 44 Dauph. 191 (1937); Union Trust Company of Pittsburgh Account, 326 Pa. 251
(1937).
26. Id. at 1042.
27. 213 Pa. 588, 63 A. 131 (1906).
28. Id. at 132.
29. 48 D. & C. 399 (Dauphin, 1942).
30. 133 U.S. 457 (1889).
3:10:
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within the intention of its makers."8 1 If the commonwealth had in-
tended to give the city the power to tax charities, it would have done so
explicitly, the majority of our court held.
In order to reconcile this decision with the declining tax base in
Pittsburgh, one must look to the specific language of the Local Tax
Enabling Act.32 The Pennsylvania courts interpret legislation to avoid
absurd results.3 3 If the legislature intended to give the city the power to
tax charities, "we would have to recognize its right to ignore the County
Assessment Law, which exempts charitable institutions from taxation,
this would in turn give the city the right to repeal any law of taxation
contrary to its policies. 3 4
The majority in the principal case did not preclude the city from
taxing some charitable activities. "Indeed it may be said to be the use
of the property in question rather than the charitable character of the
owner that ordinarily determines the right to claim the exemption." 35
Relying on Appeal of County of Allegheny v. Moontownship,86 the
majority held that the charitable institution's activity must be incidental
to its main purpose to be tax exempt. If the city finds an activity which
is not charitable in nature, they can tax it. The burden of proving
activity within the exemption lies with the charity. "The Claimant
asserting a tax exemption has the burden of bringing himself within the
exemption statute. '3 7
Since the ordinance 38 has been declared invalid the city treasury must
refund the money collected. However, must the city return all the
money? Being able to tax those activities which are not charitable, it
does not. The charities have the burden to show that their activities
are exempt. Although the city has the power to tax those activities
which are not charitable, this power is constrained by the court's deci-
sion. Unless the activity is commercial, the charity will retain its exemp-
31. Id. at 459.
32. Act 511 of 1965, P.L. 1257 PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (1970).
33. Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (1937):
Construction of Law; "legislative intent controls; the object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every
law shall be construed if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions when the words
of the law are not explicit their intention of the legislature may be ascertained by
considering among other things: the consequences of a particular interpretation ..
34. See note 7, at 23.
35. 51 AM. JUR. § 605, 606 (1939).
36. 436 Pa. 56, 258 A.2d 632 (1967).
37. University of Pittsburgh Tax Exemption Case, 208 Pa. Super 718, 219 A.2d 364
(1966).
38. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 676, Dec. 22, 1968.
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tion pursuant to the General County Assessment Law. 39 Since the
General County Assessment Law40 has been redefined to include all
taxes, a court deciding a municipality's power to tax charities exempt
under the Local Tax Enabling Act 4' would have to find these charities
exempt from all taxes.
The question of whether charitable tax exemption is a valid concept
in Pittsburgh is answered by the services which these charities perform.
The only support the city gives its hospitals is their tax exempt status.
For Pittsburgh to perform the services rendered by these institutions
would require an initial capital investment in excess of twenty-six
million dollars.42 Since the exemption amounts to one and a half million
dollars annually, the city would lose more if they were to tax charities.
If the exemption were removed, it is possible the hospitals might be
forced to close their doors.
Unlike other areas of the country, Pittsburgh's nonsupport of its
hospitals is the exception rather than the rule. An analysis of medical
care programs provided in a hundred and thirty cities in the United
States shows all but thirty-one have government operated hospitals. 4 .
The beneficial services rendered by Pittsburgh's charitable institutions
outweigh the financial benefits which Pittsburgh would receive by tax-
ing these institutions.
While an analogy may be drawn between tort immunity and tax
exemption for charities, it cannot sustain charitable taxation. The
decline of charitable tort immunity is based on the assumption institu-
tions should be held to the same degree of care as an individual.44 To
reject charitable tax exemption might lead to a lower degree of care by
these institutions.
Though these institutions charge for their services, the recent Pres-
byterian Homes Tax Exemption Case4 5 held that to deny charitable
status because a charge is made:
39. Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 862, PURMON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204 (1968).
40. Id.
41. Act 511 of 1965, P.L. 1257, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6901 (1970).
42. Address by Seymour J. Schafer, Oct. 5, 1969, special house committee established
pursuant to H.R. resolution 126, 153 session of Pa. General Assembly (1969): This resolu-
tion is known as the Pittinger Committee to study the tax inequities in the common-
wealth.
43. Id.
44. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965). In this case
the hospital did not deny negligence on its part but sought to be immune from liability
through the exemption granted to charitable institutions by our courts. This case be-
came the leading precedent by overruling all previous cases granting tort immunity in
Pennsylvania.
45. 428 Pa. 141, 236 A.2d 763 (1968).
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•.. would require us to hold that whenever a non-profit institution
made a charge for its care or services to any resident or patient, the
institution would be precluded from obtaining tax exemption. Con-
sequently, hospitals which charge large sums for care of and services
to paying patients, and colleges and universities which charge
tuition to countless students, would not be entitled to real estate
tax exemption. This interpretation and result is not required by
the language or spirit of the Constitution of Pennsylvania... 46
Although the cost of operating these institutions has caused increased
rates for those who can afford to pay, they are by their very nature
charitable and deserve the tax immunity.
When exempting an institution from a tax the exemption includes
certain activities which are conducted as incidental to its main
charitable purpose, and on which it receives an immediate profit
over and above their cost which are used to reduce the deficit
incurred by its general charitable work, this is still a charity in the
truest sense. 47
The community has the burden to care for charitable patients. To
increase the expenditures of these charitable institutions by levying
taxes on their gross receipts will result in higher charges or less efficient
service to the community.
Ronald M. Stein
CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-SELF-DEFENSE-THE DUTY TO RETREAT-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the no-retreat dwelling
house exception to the self-defense rule by holding that a person in his
place of business may lawfully resist an intruder with the use of deadly
force even though a way of escape is available.
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).
Commonwealth v. Johnston' is an innovative decision which limits
the duty to retreat in cases of self-defense. The facts of the case are
46. Id. at 154.
47. Y.M.C.A. of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. Super 332, 25 A.2d 406 (1939).
In this case a distinction was made between the property of an institution and the
activities of such. The court held that the institution was exempt from a service tax
as being a semipublic institution. This case also held that the 1933 General County
Assessment Law referred to real property. Our case implicitly overrules this interpreta-
tion given by that court as to the boundaries of the General County Assessment Law.
1. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).
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